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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46(b)-16 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-
801(8)(1997). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Respondent generally agrees with the Statement of Issues and the 
Standard of Review provided in the Petitioner's brief. However, more simply 
stated, the issue is whether the Labor Commission was correct in its legal 
conclusion that the term "compensation" as used in Section 34A-3-110, 
U.C.A. does or does not include medical benefits payable under the 
Occupational Disease Act. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of Section 34A-3-110-, U.C.A. is of central 
importance in this appeal: 
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be 
reduced and limited to the proportion of the 
compensation that would be payable if the 
occupational disease were the sole cause of disability 
or death, as the occupational disease as a causative 
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death 
when the occupational disease or any part of the 
disease: 
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1. Is causally related to employment with a 
non-Utah employer not subject to commission 
jurisdiction; 
2. Is of a character to which the employee may 
have had substantial exposure outside of 
employment or to which the general public is 
commonly exposed; 
3. Is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity 
not itself compensable; or 
4. When disability or death from any other cause 
not itself compensable is aggravated, 
prolonged, accelerated, or in any way 
contributed to by an occupational disease. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURE 
1. Respondent Tamara Edmonds filed an Application for Hearing 
with the Utah Labor Commission on September 3, 2002 wherein she sought 
further coverage for her medical condition of carpal tunnel syndrome as a 
result of repetitive trauma to her hands and arms from excessive keyboard use 
and other job activities with Ameritech Library Services. (R. at 2). 
2. The Labor Commission held an evidentiary hearing in this matter 
and thereafter referred the case for consideration by a medial panel. (R. at 143-
145). Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered by the 
Administrative Law Judge on June 28, 2005 wherein the ALJ awarded 
payment of only 10% of the medical expenses incurred for the treatment of 
Ms. Edmond's work-related aggravation of a pre-existing condition. (R. at 
167-178). 
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3. Ms. Edmonds filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor 
Commission on July 28, 2005 contesting the apportionment of medical expenses 
as set forth in the ALJ's decision. (R. at 179-188). 
4. On August 29, 2006 the Labor Commission issued its Order On 
Motion For Review wherein it determined there should be no apportionment of 
claim related medical expenses in occupational disease claims. (R. at 206-211). 
5. Petitioner Ameritech Library Services filed its Petition for Review 
with this court on September 28, 2006. 
FACTS 
The underlying facts of Ms. Edmond's employment and the nature of her 
occupational disease are not in dispute. The Findings of Fact of the Utah Labor 
Commission have not been contested. In relevant part, they are as follows: 
1. The respondent began working for Ameritech Library services, 
appellant, in 1991 and continued her employment there to mid-1999. She 
would work anywhere from eight to up to 14 hours per day. In an eight hour 
day she would spend anywhere from seven to 7 V2 hours typing with both 
hands, while often cradling a telephone on her neck. Over time she developed 
symptoms of bilateral pain, and numbness in the fingers, hands, wrists, arms, 
shoulders, neck and head. 
2. The medical panel appointed by the Utah Labor Commission 
found that the respondent's work activities acted as a 10% aggravation of non-
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industrial risk factors resulting in her carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms. (R. at 
143-145). 
3. The Administrative Law Judge found that the respondent did not 
lose any time from work due to her work related injuries and awarded only 
medical benefits related to this claim, but proportionately reduced due to the 
pre-existing conditions as found by the medical panel. (R. at 176). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The plain language of Section 34A-3-110, U.C.A. provides a formula for 
determining apportionment based on disability or death, making no mention of 
medical expenses. If the term "compensation" were defined to include medical 
benefits, then in cases where there is no disability or death but only medical 
expenses, the statute could not be applied to determine apportionment for any 
pre-existing conditions because the formula in the statute is based on making 
apportionment for disability or death benefits. 
The term "compensation" as used throughout the Utah Labor Code is 
used to reference disability benefits and medical benefits are referred to 
separately. 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted compensation to mean 
something separate from medical expenses and the Utah Legislature in 
subsequent legislation has not taken action to change or overturn the Court's 
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conclusions, hence presuming satisfaction with prior judicial constructions of the 
unchanged portions of the statute. 
To hold that the term "compensation" includes payment of medical 
expenses would result in an unconstitutional interpretation of the law by treating 
similarly situated persons - injured workers under the Workers Compensation 
Act and under the Occupational Disease Act - differently, without a rational 
basis for the dissimilar treatment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The plain language of the statute, as worded, 
requires apportionment only for disability or death 
from an occupational disease 
<iinl mil lor expenses for medical care and treatment 
The only issue before this Court is whether an injured worker's right to 
payment of medical expenses for treatment of injuries sustained in an 
occupational disease claim is subject to, and reduced by, Section 34A-3-110, 
U.C.A. 
In considering whether the Labor Commission correctly applied the law 
in this matter we should first look to the plain language of the statute itself to 
determine if the meaning of the term "compensation" can be determined from 
the section itself. 
This section, 34A-3-110, U.C.A., provides that "compensation payable 
under (the occupational disease act) shall be reduced and limited to the 
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proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational 
disease were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as 
a causative factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death." The degree 
of apportionment under Section 110 depends upon the application of the ratio of 
work-related disability to non-work disability. Here there wasn't any disability 
(not TTD or PPD) and only medical benefits are due. 
If compensation under Section 110 were to mean medical benefits as well 
as disability benefits, then apportionment under this section would be impossible 
to apply when there is no disability or death, but only medical expenses, 
because the apportionment formula as worded specifically requires 
apportionment based upon a comparison of work and non-work related 
disability, making no mention of what medical care is related to the industrial 
injury or aggravation. 
Hence, in order for the section to have consistent meaning, the term 
"compensation" must mean something related to disability benefits and not 
medical benefits. 
Had the legislature intended to apportion medical expenses as well, it 
would have been a simple matter to have worded the statute to read something 
like this, where the bold print is the added language: "...limited to the 
proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational 
disease were the sole cause of disability, death or need for medical care and 
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treatment, as the occupational disease as a causative factor bears to all the 
causes of the disability, death or need for medical care and treatment." 
Giving proper meaning to all words in the section means to not lump in 
medical expenses into the meaning of the term "compensation." 
POINT II 
Usage of the term "compensation" 
throughout the Utah Labor Code 
applies to disability compensation- benefits that are separate 
from medical expenses 
The overall usage of the term 'compensation' throughout the statutory 
language itself of Title 34A, the Utah Labor Code, as well as throughout the 
Commission's decisions over the years, is generally limited to compensation 
being equivalent to disability compensation and does not include medical 
benefits. 
There are numerous examples throughout the Code in which the statutory 
usage of the term "compensation" cannot be deemed to include medical 
benefits. A few examples, although not exhaustive, illustrate this usage: 
1. §34A-2-401(l), U.C.A. specifically recognizes the distinction 
between "compensation" and medical benefits. It provides that the benefits 
injured employees shall be paid include 
(a) compensation . . . and 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse and hospital services; 
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(ii) medicines; and 
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses. 
2. §34A-2-401(2), U.C.A. specifically recognizes this distinction 
when it refers to compensation and medical benefits as separate items: "The 
responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing and hospital 
services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided . . . " shall be on the 
employer and not the employee. 
3. §34A-2-408, U.C.A. similarly makes that specific distinction. 
Paragraph (l)(a) provides that "compensation" may not be allowed for the first 
three days after an injury is received. Paragraph (l)(b) provides that 
disbursements for medical, nurse and hospital services and for medicines and 
funeral expenses are payable for the first three days. This clarifies that medical 
expenses are not included in what is mean as compensation. Paragraph (2) of 
that section provides that, if temporary total disability lasts more that 14 days, 
"compensation" shall be payable for the first three days. 
4. §34A-2-413(l)(a), U.C.A. provides: "In cases of permanent total 
disability resulting from an industrial accident or occupational disease, the 
employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section." 
The section then outlines all of the "compensation" to be paid. In doing 
so, no mention is made of medical benefits or expenses. Nevertheless, an 
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injured employee is unquestionably entitled to such medical benefits, although 
they are not part of the "compensation" the employee is to receive. 
5. §34A-2-413(5), U.C.A. provides, "the compensation payable" 
after "312 weeks of compensation" shall be reduced by 50% of the Social 
Security retirement benefits. If compensation included medical benefits, this 
Social Security offset would apply against medical expenses incurred as well as 
the PTD benefits that are payable. However, medical benefits are not and have 
never been reduced once an injured worker begins receiving Social Security 
retirement benefits. 
6. §34A-2-422, U.C.A. provides: "Compensation before payment 
shall be exempt from all claims of creditors . . . and shall be paid only to 
employees or their dependents . . . " Again, if medical benefits were included in 
the definition, this would mean that all medical expenses must be paid directly 
to the employees themselves, rather than directly to the medical providers. 
7. §34A-2-301, U.C.A. provides that places of employment are to 
be safe and that, for the willful failure of an employee to comply with 
applicable provisions or safety requirements, "Compensation as provided in this 
chapter shall be increased 15% . . ." Under Appellants' argument, this would 
mean that, if an employer's safety violation impacted the employee, the 
employer would have to pay the medical providers an additional 15%, 
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something which has never been done and which would not serve the purpose 
intended or, for that matter, any other logical purpose. 
8. In addition to the foregoing, §34A-3-107, U.C.A. emphasizes that 
there is nothing under the occupational disease act which is intended to treat an 
employee's right to medical benefits any differently than he would be treated for 
a similar workers compensation injury. In paragraph (2) of §34A-3-107, it 
specifically provides that, "The disabled employee is entitled to medical, 
hospital and burial expenses equivalent to those provided in Chapter 2," with no 
mention of apportionment or reference to Section 110. 
There would be no equivalence if the payment of medical benefits were 
reduced by whatever percentage of pre-existing conditions were related to the 
occupational disease with no reduction of medical benefits in a regular workers 
compensation claim where there are related pre-existing conditions. 
POINT III 
Utah case law supports the conclusion that 
the term "compensation" does not include medical benefits, and that has not 
been overturned by subsequent statutory changes to the Utah Labor Code 
In 1979, the Utah Supreme Court in Kennecott Copper Corp, v. Industrial 
Commission. 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979), concluded that the term "compensation" 
did not include medical benefits. This was affirmed again in Christensen v. 
Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). 
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We would note that despite the clear statement of the Utah Supreme Court 
differentiating medical benefits from compensation, the Utah legislature did not 
subsequently amend the Workers' Compensation Act or Occupational Disease 
Act to specify that compensation includes medical benefits. Rather in all 
subsequent substantial amendments to the Act in 1988, 1991, 1994, as well as in 
amendments in other years, the legislature has not changed the statutes to specify 
a definition of compensation that includes medical expenses. 
Further, there is no definition of the term "compensation" in the 
Occupational Disease Act itself. 
Hence, the meaning of compensation, as interpreted by the Utah Supreme 
Court, has been allowed to stand, notwithstanding the many substantial changes to 
the Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Acts over the years. 
As cited in Christensen, "a well-established canon of statutory construction 
provides that where a legislature amends a portion of a statute but leaves other 
portions unamended, or re-enacts them without change, the legislature is 
presumed to have been satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unchanged 
portions of the statute and to have adopted them as consistent with its own intent. 
State v. Roberts. 56 Utah 136, 190 P. 351 (1920); Ouaremba v. Allan, 67 N.J. 1, 
334 A.2d 321 (1975); Ladd v. Board of Trustees, 23 Cal.App.3d 984,100 
Cal.Rptr. 571 (1972); People v. Mills. 40 I11.2d 4, 237 N.E.2d 697 (1968)." 
Christensen at 756. 
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POINT IV 
To require apportionment of medical expenses under the Occupational 
Disease Act, with no apportionment in the Workers' Compensation Act, 
would amount to an unconstitutional violation of the uniform operation of 
laws/equal protection clauses of the Utah and Federal Constitutions as it 
would treat similarly situated persons differently without a rational basis 
for doing so. 
If the Occupational Disability Act is interpreted to treat similarly situated 
employees differently than Workers' Compensation claimants, based solely 
upon whether the work-related illness or injury was a workers' compensation 
claim rather than an occupational disease claim, it would be subject to being 
struck down as being in violation of the Utah State Constitution, Article I, 
Section 24 wherein all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation, or in 
violation of the equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution, as 
has been done in some other states. See, for instance, Schmill v. Liberty 
Northwest Insurance Corp., 67 P. 3d 290 (Mont., 2003). 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, the Uniform Operation 
of Law Clause, is considered to be the Utah equivalent of the federal equal 
protection guarantee in the 14th Amendment that "persons similarly situated 
should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should 
not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." Wood v. Univ. of 
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Utah Medical Center. 67 P.3d 436 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002), and Malan v. Lewis. 
693 P.2d 669 (Utah 1984). 
Under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, a two-part test is 
used in the analysis of ensuring uniform operation of the laws: "First, a law 
must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory 
classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be based 
on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of 
the statute. Malan v. Lewis at 670. 
The first prong of the analysis presupposes the creation of classes 
within a law and requires a consideration of the level of scrutiny applied to 
the discrimination inherent in any classification. In State v. Merrill 2005 
UT 34 (UT 2005), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that: 
Every legislative act is in one sense discriminatory. The 
Legislature cannot in one act legislate as to all persons or all 
subject matters. It is inclusive as to some class or group and as 
to some human relationships, transactions, or functions and 
exclusive as to the remainder. For that reason, to be 
unconstitutional, the discrimination must be unreasonable or 
arbitrary. A classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in 
its inclusion or exclusion features so long as there is some 
basis for the differentiation between classes or subject matters 
included as compared to those excluded from its operation 
provided the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the 
purposes to be accomplished by the act. 
Here we have the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational 
Disease Act, both part of an integrated system providing for injured workers and 
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their families. This system provides the exclusive remedy for injured workers for 
on-the-job injuries and illnesses. 
For this analysis, we may assume that all injured workers entitled to 
workers compensation or occupational disease benefits are similarly 
situated. They have all suffered a work place injury resulting in the need 
for medical care and possibly resulting in periods of disability. Their 
recourse for compensation due to the impact of that injury is limited solely 
to the provisions of the Utah Workers' Compensation or Occupational 
Disease Acts. 
The first group or classification consists of those injured workers 
eligible for workers compensation benefits under Chapter 2 of Title 34A of 
the Utah Code. The second class consists of injured workers whose injuries 
are in the nature of an occupational disease, Chapter 3 of Title 34A of the 
Utah Code, rather than a one-time work accident. The nature of how the 
injury or illness occurred is the only distinguishing factor between the two 
classes which involve work-related claims. These classes are similarly 
situated for equal protection/uniform operation of law. 
In the first group, which consists of workers compensation claimants, if the 
"accident, injury or death in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated, or 
incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or (arose) out of the 
employee's employment," 34A-2-105, U.C.A., then the injured worker is entitled 
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to payment of certain disability benefits based upon the period of medical 
recovery or upon the extent and permanency of the disability, and full lifetime 
medical benefits for injury related health problems. There is no apportionment of 
any kind of benefit, but for PPD benefits, when there is a pre-existing condition 
that was aggravated by an otherwise compensable injury. Medical expenses are 
paid in full for injury related care and treatment, even if there the injury 
aggravated a pre-existing condition. 
In the second group, which consists of occupational disease claimants, the 
claim is similarly compensable where the claimed occupational disease arose "out 
of or in the course of employment and is medically caused or aggravated by that 
employment," 34A-3-103, U.C.A. Benefits payable consist of disability benefits 
for periods and amounts of temporary and permanent disability, as well as 
payment of medical benefits for treatment and care for the injury or illness. 
We submit there is no substantial difference between the two classes other 
than the legal theory under which compensation is awarded. In fact, it is possible 
for some illnesses or injuries to qualify under both or either the Workers' 
Compensation Act or the Occupational Disease Act. Both arise out of the 
employment relationship and both are the exclusive remedy for injured workers 
under Utah law. 
If the appellants were to be correct in their assertions that medical benefits 
should be considered compensation and should be apportioned under Section 110 
of the Occupational Disease Act, then we have to determine whether there is a 
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rational basis for treating these two similarly situated classes of injured workers 
differently. 
The second prong of the analysis pertains to whether this different 
treatment has a reasonable tendency to further the purposes of the statute. 
What are the legitimate purposes of the statute? What are the 
purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease 
Act? While the Acts themselves do not contain a description of the 
objectives, the early case of Park Utah Consolidated Mines v. Industrial 
Commission, 36 P.2d 979 (Utah 1934) provides a good description. It 
explains that the Act is a beneficent law that affords injured workers 
"simple, adequate, and speedy means of securing compensation, to the end 
that the cost of human wreckage may be taxed against the industry that 
employs it." It is intended to indemnify injured workers when they cease to 
earn wages and pay for the cost of injury related medical care and 
treatment. 
We can see absolutely no rational basis for treating the two groups 
differently. In both groups the injured worker was gainfully employed 
before the injury. In both groups, as a result of a workplace accident or 
exposure of one kind or another, which either wholly caused an injury or 
aggravated a pre-existing condition, injured workers come to need medical 
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care and in some cases become disabled and in need of compensation for 
the period he or she is unable to work because of the industrial accident or 
exposure. 
In one class, full medical benefits are paid for the extent of the work 
related injury/illness or aggravation. If it is a permanent aggravation of a 
pre-existing condition, coverage for medical care is permanent and is still 
paid in full. 
In the other class, under the appellants' contentions, then despite a 
permanent aggravation of a pre-existing condition, medical benefits are to 
be limited proportionately to the amount of the aggravation when 
considered with all causes and condition - even when no medical care was 
needed before the work related aggravation. 
We submit such an interpretation has no rational basis or any reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the statute or of the Occupational Disease 
Act 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should find that the Labor Commission 
correctly interpreted the law and did so in such a way that allows for 
constitutional application of the law to injured workers and their families. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the respondent respectfully asks this 
Court to fully affirm the final order of the Utah Labor Commission in this 
matter. 
Dated this 21st day of February, 2007. 
Phillip B. Shell 
Attorney for Respondent Tamara Edmonds 
21 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of February 2007, I caused to be 
mailed by first class mail, postage pre-paid, two (2) copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to each of the following: 
Theodore E. Kanell 
Joseph C. Alamilla 
Plant, Christensen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Utah Labor Commission 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Priillip B. Shell 
Attorney for Respondent 
22 
